This presentation sets forth an abbreviated history of the development of public international law's restraints on the use of armed force. It also sketches conceptual differences within this area. Beyond history, our examination is cast largely in terms of the U.N. collective security structure and the proper reading of U.N. Charter Articles 2(4) and 51 (including legal concepts of self-defense with aspects of necessity and aggression). A short summary then follows of how related legal positions are reflected in the U.N. Security Council Resolutions pertaining to Iraq's occupation of Kuwait (full texts of the Resolutions are attached in Appendix A). Finally, we go beyond the legality of employing armed force per se to address selected collateral legal problems posed by mandatory collective response to breaches of international peace.
 

All these issues can be understood only against the backdrop of the intended supranational peacekeeping role of the Security Council under the U.N. Charter (and distant echoes of the predecessor League of Nations' failure). The Security Council's longterm Cold War institutional paralysis led to a situation in which the unilateral self-defense concept achieved predominance, conflict was often waged by proxy in insurgencies (thus not always international at first glance) and States' cooperation was limited. [1] Recent political changes in the Soviet Union (and now the Bush Administration's successful pursuit of an apparent Security Council mandate to use armed force, if necessary, to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait) have revived hopes that regional conflicts can be managed under the multinational Security Council system (as contemplated in the immediate aftermath of World War II). The revival has happened so fast, however, that domestic legal and political discourse may not have fully digested the collateral implications.
 
 

The development of modern principles limiting armed force is best understood against the backdrop of 19^th Century views concerning legality of its use and the formal, legal concept of war. In opposition to older natural law views requiring 'just cause' for a 'just' or legal war, the positivistic 19^th Century international law concept of war adhered to the view that each State as an element of its sovereignty retained the right to go to war against another State at any time for any reason, or for no reason at all (under jus belli ac pacis). At the same time, the use of force in international relations was distinguishable from war per se if only arbitrarily under doctrines concerning the state of war (incorporating a subjective, intent-based test of animo beligerendi that required one or sometimes both parties intend or believe that a state of war exist before the use of force would be viewed as a hostile act in the course of a war). In spite of propagandistic attempts to justify the use of force in asserting another State's prior affront (real or imagined), it was generally acknowledged under 19^th Century views of international law that armed force could be used to protect a State's economic and other interests during peacetime as well as wartime (distinguished under traditional legal categories as involving the "law of peace" versus the "law of war").
 

Determining the legality of armed force had little meaning in the context of a system where the right to make war was legally unlimited. However, collateral views about rationales for recognizing the use of force retain some relevance for modern international law principles. For these purposes, one can distinguish between older views recognizing self-help or self-preservation as the justification for the use of force. The self-help rationale focused on the lack of an adjudicatory and enforcement mechanism under then-contemporary international law (providing a State with no effective recourse if an obligation owed by another State were violated). On the other hand, the self-preservation rationale responded to the perception that a State must have some right to resist attacks on its interests (and ultimately on its very existence).
 

The development of modern international law views concerning war and the use of force dates back to the end of the 19^th Century. [2] It incorporates two distinct areas of legal attention. Within the traditional coverage of the law of war, from the time of the First Hague Peace conference (resulting in the various 1899 Hague Conventions and Declarations largely limiting armaments, followed by the Second Peace Conference resulting in the 1907 Hague Conventions, and through modern day arms control agreements and the various Geneva Protocols) one legal strand has accepted the idea of armed conflict but sought essentially on humanitarian grounds to limit the fashion in which hostilities would be conducted. We pass over this humanitarian law, since it will be treated by another speaker. Our attention turns instead to the second legal strand, namely the limitation of the use of force itself under international law. Development of the second legal strand dates back effectively to the founding of the League of Nations in the aftermath of World War I and through the applicable U.N. Charter interpretation ultimately affects all modern uses of armed force.
 

The League's founding is acknowledged as a watershed, reflecting the general political consensus in the aftermath of World War I that the traditional law jus belli ac pacis was grossly unsuitable as a method of resolving international disputes. Without addressing the League's eventual failure to maintain international peace, we focus here on three narrow legal points involving the treaty character of the 1919 League Covenant. First, the apparent renunciation of war as a method of settling international disputes was recognized at the time of the League's founding as a departure from existing customary law. This creation of new international law by treaty was thus effective only among League Member States and did not immediately accede to the status of new and universally binding customary law. Most but not all of the major powers were members (for example, the United States was not). Second, the operative Covenant provisions largely referred to a rejection of 'war,' with the result that at least initially older, intent-based state of war doctrines arguably permitted a State to use armed force in the conduct of international affairs (but then to deny that "war was involved). To the extent Article 10 of the Covenant apparently required mutual assistance against "aggression" or its threat against the "territorial integrity and existing political independence" of League Members, this undertaking was characterized as a moral rather than legal obligation by some States. Each Member State was left individually to decide what its assistance should consist of in a specific instance. Third, while outlawing a "resort to war," in opposition to the current U.N. Charter the Covenant's language was literally silent on "self-defense." Covenant Article 16 stipulated that a Member State's violation of its obligations in resorting to war would be deemed an act of war against all other Members, and it contemplated that those States could then wage a defensive war against the transgressor (not avoiding the previously discussed problems inherent in keying the response to 'war'). Mention is made of self-defense only indirectly or by inference as in the problematic mutual assistance undertaking of Covenant Article 10.
 

The Covenant's shortcomings were recognized already in the 1920s, and a combination of general anti-war sentiment and demands for structural improvement in the means for peaceful resolution of disputes (chiefly arbitration and conciliation) led to further conferences and treaties. By the time of the 1925 Locarno Treaties (providing for the peaceful arbitration of disputes among World War I's European protagonists), Article 2 of the centerpiece guaranty treaty distinguishes between "attack," "invasion," or "resort to war," and expressly recognizes that these do not include the use of armed force in the exercise of "legitimate defense" or pursuant to actions taken under the League's aegis or various Covenant provisions.
 

The 1928 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War ("Kellogg-Briant Pact") represents the effective culmination of efforts between the World Wars to address perceived problems in the Covenant and League system. The fact that the United States was a signatory and the Kellogg-Briant Pact''s ambition to go beyond the Covenant substantively (and eventually to form the basis of new general international law excluding aggressive war) make it particularly important. By its terms the Kellogg-Briand Pact condemned "recourse to war" to resolve disputes and "renounce[d] it as an instrument of national policy." The Covenant''s unfortunate employment of "war" was repeated, raising the questions whether the Kellogg-Briand Pact was subject to the same infirmities of whether it was intended generally to establish that, subject to limited exceptions, the use of armed-force to resolve disputes was unlawful. However, the better view is that signatory States' use of armed force without sufficient legal cause itself already was rendered generally unlawful. Customary law incorporated this view in any case during the 1930s (as confirmed by war crimes tribunals in the aftermath of World War II).
 

The Kellogg-Briand Pact contained on its face no reference to self-defense, however, in the preparatory work and by exchange of diplomatic notes the parties variously reserved rights of "self-defense," "legitimate defense" or "legitimate self-defense." The United States itself expressly stated by note that nothing therein "restrict[ed] or impair[ed] in any way the right of self-defense" which is "inherent in every sovereign state and implicit in every treaty." The United States" note went on to characterize self-defense as an "inalienable" and "natural right," which "[e]very nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions" to exercise and apparently laid claim to the ability of each State to decide for itself at least initially when its own right of self-defense applied.
 

During the 1930s legal developments began to diverge. One branch eventually followed by Socialist law and Developing Nation views (predominantly under the Continental legal science view) focused on the legal concept of aggression chiefly in territorial, first-strike terms (harkening back to League Covenant Article 10, conceived of originally in response to Germany''s World War I invasion of Belgium). Another branch incorporating the American view concentrated on the legal concept of self-defense (rooted in customary law ideas of self-preservation). Legal analysis under both viewed large scale military invasion by an aggressor State as unlawful. However, opinions differed concerning the legality of low-level intervention in asserting traditional diplomatic protection (military operations carried out on foreign territory in protection of the lives or property of a State''s nationals) and the assertion of "self-defense" in the protection of vital interests of a political or economic nature.
 
 

The most important difference between the League of Nations and U.N. arguably lies in enforcement mechanisms rather than fine substantive distinctions concerning views of armed force's legality. Given international law's inherent lack of coercive enforcement mechanisms (because there is no supranational "sovereign" to levy penalties in the Austinian sense), enforcement mechanisms and substantive law standards enjoy equal significance. The U.N. Charter incorporates both modern substantive law norms governing the use of armed force as well as a new organizational structure to enforce international peace in the form of the Security Council system. [3] The League structure permitted only coordination of individual States' voluntary responses to aggression, while the Security Council system permits designation of an aggressor State to be coupled with a mandatory coercive regime (requiring member States to oppose the disturbance of international peace, using force if necessary ). At an extreme, traditional law's categories of belligerent and neutral States have been displaced by aggressor States and all other States (arrayed against them under Security Council direction).
 

The final treaty terms of the U.N. Charter were negotiated at the 1945 San Francisco Conference on International Organization (open to all interested States except the defeated Axis Powers). Under the circumstances, the U.N. collective security system was devised in a conscious effort to revive many of the League of Nations" aspirations in a more effective enforcement structure. Beyond the danger of general conflagration (World War II had just ended), the drafters of the Charter had before their eyes the example of the League's ultimate failure in its 1930s dealings with regional conflicts: Japan's 1931 invasion of Manchuria, the 1934-35 Italo-Abyssinian War, the 1939 Soviet-Finnish War and Germany's progressive occupations of the Rhineland (1936), Austria (1938), and Czechoslovakia (1939).
 

The San Francisco Conference saw a variety of proposals by small States addressed to reconciliation of non-intervention principles with collective response to aggression along League lines (and an attempt to make collective response mandatory, a goal sought by weak States and resisted by strong States ever since the failure of League Covenant Article 10). The Security Council system agreed upon addressed perceived flaws in the League Covenant system by providing that a unified Security Council could compel all U.N. Member States to respond to threats against international peace (under U.N. Charter Chapter VII). In matters concerning international peace, however, by virtue of special veto provisions no action could be forced against the will of any Permanent Member of the Security Council (World War II's chief Allied Powers, France, Britain, China, the Soviet Union and the United States). When united, however, the Security Council could (1) withdraw matters concerning international peace from U.N. General Assembly consideration as well as (2) preclude unilateral self-defense from interfering with Security Council measures. On a substantive law level, a fair reading of the San Francisco proceedings illuminates the conceptual interrelationship of current U.N. Charter Article 2(1) (sovereign equality of all States, the basis of the new general U.N. system), Article 2(3) (calling for the peaceful resolution of all disputes), Article 2(4) (apparently absolute prohibition of the use of armed force against the "territorial integrity or political independence" of any State" recalling the language of League Covenant Article 10) and Article 51 (specifically recognizing the exercise of collective or individual self-defense pending Security Council action against threats to international peace).
 

On an institutional level, the opposing vetoes of the United States and the Soviet Union largely foreclosed Security Council-mandated coercive peacekeeping activity during the entire Cold War period. Korea was the sole significant exception prior to the current Kuwait situation (minor exceptions include Rhodesia). As an organizational matter, a general form of collective security response evolved during the Korea situation in the form of voluntary action by Member States acting through the U.N. General Assembly (so-called "Uniting for Peace Resolutions," controversial and, due to the voluntary nature of any State's assistance, subject to many of the League Covenant system's infirmities). For the most part, however, the legal basis for any State's collective security response revolved around divergent interpretations under the U.N. Charter of competing views of self-defense and aggression developing since the 1930s. As a technical matter, the substantive law issues revolve around concerns whether drafters of the U.N. Charter intended to depart from progressive legal developments concerning the use of armed force dating back to the creation of the League (as opposed to merely incorporating applicable customary law as understood on the eve of World War II). Different readings of the relevant treaty provisions are the literal source of widely divergent interpretations of modern self-defense rights: the proper interpretation and interplay between Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter. Departing from the Covenant's and Kellogg-Briand Pact's problematic usage of the term "war," Article 2(4) is expressly directed against the "use of force":
 

"All [Member States] shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
 

Departing from prior treaties" literal silence, Article 51 expressly addresses "self-defense":
 

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members . . . shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council . . . to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."
 

Based upon technical principles of treaty interpretation, the correct reading of the U.N. Charter is that Article 2(4) is more than a general statement of principles and directly covers the use of armed force in international relations (as augmented by Article 2(1)'s sovereign equality concept). It largely incorporates the customary law in this area developed particularly in the wake of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (subject to a recognition that certain United Nations organs have a final power of determination in such matters). Article 51's specific mention of self-defense should not be understood as an independent locus of textual interpretation. Instead, Article 51 simply states a rule of preliminary disposition pending Security Council action (which preliminary disposition may remain permanently in place insofar as the Security Council is paralyzed by veto or chooses not to act). However, this statement of the law (essentially in terms of the American view) is probably a minority view in the international community of States.
 

On a structural basis, modern views of self-defense may be separated into two polar groups. The American view focuses on Article 51's "inherent right" language viewing Article 51 largely as a general savings clause for the customary law (viewing Article 2(4) as a rather abstract general statement of principle rather than an operative treaty provision). Socialist law views (seemingly with Continental legal science and Developing Nation views) see Article 51 as the proper focus for examination of the modern concept of permissible self-defense (viewing Article 2(4) by its terms as permitting the use of armed force only under Article 51 self-defense or the authority of U.N. organ). Their interpretation of permissible self-defense under the U.N. Charter involves literal interpretation of Article 51's first clause (transforming "armed attack" into a term of art alternatively precluding self-defense claims in response to de minimis disturbances of international peace and anticipatory self-defense as recognized by traditional law). By this chain of reasoning, Article 51's armed attack terminology prescribing the boundaries of permissible self-defense is read into Article 2(4) as the source of the aggression prohibition. This is linked in the case of the Continental legal science view to a variety of doctrinal interpretations of the self-defense concept (apparently influenced in varying degrees by domestic law concepts of self-defense and necessity). In the case of Socialist law and certain Developing Nations views, they are joined more directly to aggression in a pairing of Articles 2(4) and 51.
 

Thus, the self-defense and aggression concepts are linked in uneasy fashion under modern international law. For our purposes, we distinguish here between the two basic approaches to self-defense noted above. On a technical level, the two differ on whether self-defense under the U.N. Charter should be treated as a definitional construct delimited by views of aggression itself or whether the content of the self-defense concept should be derived from a restrictive view of the older customary law embodying a self-preservation rationale. Both approaches nominally treat self-defense and aggression as independent concepts, but the definitional construct approach treats self-defense as aggression's mirror image while the customary law view itself is severed from the aggression concept. The aggression concept (and indirectly the true scope of U.N. Charter Article 2(4)''s textually absolute prohibition on violations of territorial integrity) over time has evaded any generally accepted definition in various U.N.-related proceedings. [4] Beyond the easy case of a large scale military invasion (as with Iraq''s attempted annexation of Kuwait), there continues to be substantial disagreement about the scope of aggression viewed as a legal concept. Beyond intellectual disputation, however, the determination of what constitutes aggression is vitally important under this approach when it is allowed negatively to define self-defense.
 
 
 

Major differences have revolved around issues such as "indirect aggression" (crucial during the Cold War). The American view maintains that sponsored insurgencies normally constitute grounds for collective self-defense measures against the sponsoring State. Meanwhile, Socialist law and Developing Nations views claim special rights to undisturbed external support of national liberation fronts and anti-colonial movements under self-determination or similar principles (in the Middle East context, Arab States" support for the P.L.O.). For technical reasons, the Continental legal science view characteristics such foreign sponsorship in most circumstances as "mere intervention" (not justifying collective self-defense measures against the sponsoring State or the use of force on a foreign State''s territory against insurgents operating from crossborder sanctuaries under specific interpretations of U.N. Charter Article 2(4)). As a result, leading self-defense precedents supporting the American view have been rejected or recharacterized beyond recognition (e.g., The Caroline [5]). The American view itself has departed from traditional law principles from time to time in postulating a right for States to use armed force in a foreign State in support of its citizens" fundamental human rights (impinged on by totalitarian governments). Differing views are also apparent in connection with the use of armed force abroad in situations such as hostage rescues and anti-terrorism measures. In the Kuwait context, these legal concerns might present themselves in connection with military action against pro-Iraqi groups waging a war of terrorism from third country sanctuaries outside Iraq (given media reports that Palestinian factions are planning worldwide terrorist attacks if military action is taken against Iraq).
 

As the converse of aggression, the definitional construct view of self-defense also has not usually been considered to incorporate restrictive elements accompanying the traditional customary law concept of self-defense (most notably the necessity and proportionality requirements under the Caroline test, as required under the American view). Instead, as a military matter, a State considered to be the victim of aggression might equally well restrict its military operations to driving out invaders (without its own troops crossing its borders), or might carry the war to the enemy by its troops" invasion of enemy territory. To the extent proportionality is required, however, there is precedent reaching back into the League period (the 1924 Greco-Bulgarian Frontier Incident) to the effect that excessive force initiated in putative self-defense itself is a violation (and may be characterized as aggression under some views). In the Kuwait context, these legal concerns present themselves in consideration of military options such as "massive attack" (perhaps air attack analogous to the World War II decision to avoid major American casualties anticipated in the invasion of Japan by bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki, whether or not involving weapons of mass destruction ) and by-passing Iraqi military targets located in Kuwait in favor of direct attacks on Iraqi territory. On the current facts, proportionality does not raise serious concerns for military operations to force Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait (given the magnitude of Iraqi aggression in the purported annexation of an entire State). Beyond political considerations, however, these concerns may account in part for newspaper reports to the effect that certain States providing troops opposed to the occupation of Kuwait would not participate in any attack on Iraqi territory (but presumably would participate in attacks on Iraqi military forces in occupied Kuwait).
 

The Postwar International Court of Justice cases addressing the use of armed force are only two in number (another is pending). [6] The 1949 Corfu Channel Case ("Corfu Channel Case") involved the alleged State responsibility of Albania for foreign warships" mine-inflicted losses suffered in its territorial waters during peacetime. [7] As a substantive matter, the case''s peculiar posture presented substantial issues both in the area of the law of straits and territorial waters as well as the threat or use of force within another State''s jurisdiction, together with the basic issue of Albanian responsibility for the mine damage. For our purposes, it suffices to note that the decision in the Corfu Channel Case is inconsistent in important ways with the restrictive reading of U.N. Charter Article 2(4) customarily associated with the definitional construct approach to self-defense.
 

The 1984 Case Concerning Military and Para-military Activities In and Against Nicaragua ("Contra Case")[8] is the Court''s most recent pronouncement on the self-defense concept. On a very basic level, if for no other reason, the opinion is noteworthy as an implicit confirmation by the International Court of Justice of the post-World War II was crimes tribunals" rejection of the American view expressed in connection with its reservation to the Kellogg-Briand Pact (the position that a State is the sole judge of its own activities asserted to be in the exercise of self-defense rights). However, it attracted comparatively more attention among American jurists to compulsory jurisdiction issues and the International Court of Justice''s general role than to its substantive pronouncements on self-defense (U.S. disagreement with jurisdictional finds led to withdrawal from the case between the preliminary and merits phases). Further, the Court''s peculiar approach to limitations on its jurisdiction resulted in the application of what it referred to as a variety of customary law (despite liberal references to the U.N. and O.A.S. Charters), rendering interpretation of the precedent problematic. However, read closely it appears that the Court effectively adopted the definitional construct approach to self-defense, essentially typing it to the related interpretation of U.N. Charter Articles 2(4) and 51 (that U.N. Charter Article 2(4) restrictions on the use of armed force permit its use only under the direction of a U.N. organ or under a restrictive idea of self-defense keyed to Article 51's "armed attack" language), largely divorcing it from traditional customary law views of self-defense.
 

A full discussion of the pending case entitled Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) ("Flight 655 Case," involving the 1988 downing of an Iranian civil airliner over the Persian Gulf by the U.S.S. Vincennes) is beyond the scope of this presentation . [9] However, its potential importance should be recognized based upon the assumption that the Court will be called upon directly to address issues of self-defense, necessity and related matters under U.N. Charter Articles 2(4) and 51. The original Iranian application was filed May 17, 1989, Iran submitted its memorial on July 24, 1990 and the United States countermemorial is now due March 4, 1991. Unlike the Contra Case, the United States indicated its apparent willingness to appear and argue the case on its merits prior to the invasion of Kuwait (given practical constraints in maintaining a multinational alliance, it would be difficult now for the United States not to appear). On its face, the substance of the Flight 655 Case is directed at international civil aviation treaty law. The United States" position is that, while the downing of Flight 655 was a tragic mistake, it was incidental to the Vincennes" lawful use of force in self-defense and so no legal responsibility attached to the act. Given views of civil aviation treaty law expressed following the 1983 Soviet downing of Korean Airlines Flight KE 007, it appears that the civil aviation treaty undertakings are subject to the reservation of rights under the U.N. Charter (here in particular Articles 2(4) and 51). Thus, the issue will be joined over the legality of the Vincennes" use of armed force against the aircraft. If it were lawful under the Charter, no violation of civil aviation law should be recognized. Presumably the Court will be called upon to to address the widely differing views of self-defense and, on the facts of the incident, whether the Charter permits anticipatory self-defense and whether a State is the sole judge of the scope of its self-defense interests.
 
 

Lawyers especially should read the texts of Security Council Resolutions concerning the Kuwaiti situation (attached in Appendix A: 1990 Resolutions No. 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 677 and 678). Many "make law" under U.N. Charter Chapter VII in terms of authorizing measures up to and including the use of armed force and obligate all U.N. Member States (including the United State and Iraq) to act in accordance with specific Security Council mandates. Other speakers will address chronology and details to date, so our examination of the resolutions is limited to remarks on their incorporation of principles already discussed.
 

In terms of the Security Council''s formal claim to jurisdiction, in Resolution 660 it determined that Iraq''s invasion of Kuwait constituted a "breach of international peace and security" (recalling U.N. Charter Article 39, empowering the Security Council to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression and . . . decide [what coercive measures should be taken, including the use of armed force]"). In Resolutions 661 and 662, the invasion is characterized as impinging on ''sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait" (recalling U.N. Charter Articles 2(1) and 2(4)). Further, Iraqi actions against diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and abductions of foreign nations were characterized as "aggressive acts" in Resolution 667 (recalling U.N. Charter Article 39). At the same time, the Security Council has asserted its right to exclude U.N. General Assembly participation in the Kuwait situation (under U.N. Charter Article 12(1)). However, in Resolution 661 the Security Council expressly recognized the continued ability of Member States to use armed force under a collective self-defense rationale (recalling U.N. Charter Article 51 and reflecting a conscious choice not to preclude unilateral action by individual States).
 
 
 

Beyond demands that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait, the Security Council initially asserted its authority to compel Member States to undertake mandatory coercive acts in connection with its declaration of an economic blockade of Iraq and occupied Kuwait (including shipping under Resolution 661 and aircraft under Resolution 670, with an authorization to employ armed force against maritime vessels to ensure compliance under Resolution 665). In Resolution 678, the Security Council finally asserted its full authority in (1) reiterating that Iraq comply with the demands of Resolution 660 (withdrawal from Kuwait) and subsequent resolutions, (2) authorizing Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait to "use all necessary means" (understood to include armed force) to implement the relevant resolutions and to "restore international peace and security" if Iraq had not already fully complied by January 15, 1991 and 93) calling upon all States "to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of" implementation of the resolutions.
 

Here we confront some of the legal complications currently lost from public and seemingly governmental view (given that all attention is now riveted on the January 15, 1991 deadline). The more important questions deal with longterm American views of multilateral collective defense (i.e., maintaining international peace through the supranational Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter as intended in the immediate aftermath of World War II) as opposed to the Cold War norm of unilateral collective defense (i.e., maintaining international peace through State-to-State defense compacts implemented in the exercise of States" independent self-defense rights under the U.N. Charter).
 

If the Kuwait situation leads to renewed interest in multilateral, supranational peacekeeping premised upon general opposition to "aggression," one must recognize that in one sense this is only the third time the United States has been presented with the clear choice. The first time, the United States declined to join the League of Nations. The second time, the United States wholeheartedly sponsored the United Nations. It should be noted, however, that Cold War paralysis of the Security Council precluded multilateral collective defense. It may be appropriate to embrace multilateral collective defense this third time, but not without clear recognition of the costs it entails. One hastens to add that rejection of the multilateral collective defense idea need not entail the rejection of the United Nations ideal itself. The United Nations as we know it already functions under unilateral collective self-defense. Further, the veto power of Permanent Members of the Security Council has always meant that "mandatory" coercive measures are not truly mandatory as to these select States or their allies.
 

The grounds of the United States" failure to join the league of Nations prominently featured Senate dissatisfaction with League Covenant Article 10's guaranty of foreign States" territorial integrity and political independence. [10] the treaty failed when President Wilson refused to accept Senate reservations, including one to the effect that the United States could not be required by the League to provide American troops to enforce Article 10. Disregarding isolationist sentiments and political antagonism directed against Wilson, this opposition was rooted in constitutional and political concerns about a situation in which the United States might be forced by treaty to commit American troops and/or bearer the financial burdens of a war in which it had no substantial interest. In short, it challenged the premise that the United States has a significant interest in opposing aggression as a general principle. On a disorganized basis, these political concerns have resurfaced in the Kuwait situation without being tied directly to the Security Council system itself. [11] Challenges have been directed against the wisdom of voluntarily committing American troops, which criticism presumably would be even louder if the commitment were perceived as mandatory.
 

Constitutional concerns may be misdirected in the Kuwait situation by a general lack of appreciation of the obligations which can be imposed under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Replaying domestic law controversies current since Vietnam, the debate has focused on separation of powers issues relating to whether Congressional approval is required under the War Powers Act and to a lesser extent on the U.N. Participation Act of 1945 (the domestic implementing legislation for the U.N. Charter as a non-self-executing treaty [12]). As a result, it seems to lose sight of the fact that, regardless of the domestic law argument, a good case can be made that the United States already has a binding international law obligation under Resolution 678 to provide troops under appropriate circumstances (because the United States is a Member State, and Resolution 678's "best efforts" mandate to all States to implement Resolution 660 is as binding for it as for a non-Security Council Member).
 

From the viewpoint of public international law, the obligation is incurred when the Security Council approves a resolution (regardless of domestic separation of power concerns). Thus, in a real sense the die is already cast when the U.S. representative to the Security Council casts his vote under the President''s direction. Under American views of international law, Congress and the President may constitutionally disregard international law obligations (i.e., subsequent federal statutes inconsistent with treaty obligations take precedence before domestic courts under applicable constitutional interpretations of the Supremacy Clause and, despite some dissenting voices relying on the President''s Duty to Uphold the Law Clause, the better view is that the Executive Branch in the conduct of foreign relations can similarly disregard binding international law obligations). However, disregarding the international law obligation under domestic law does not vitiate it any more than does the breach of a contract dissolve the contract''s legally binding character. A State responsibility analysis (public international law''s version of liability for non-observance of legal obligations) for failure to comply with a Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter is beyond the scope of this presentation.
 

Concerning the effect of such a breach on the idea of multilateral supranational peacekeeping, however, one need only consult the historical precedent of major League Powers" refusal to implement sanctions against Italy recommended by the League of Nations Council in the wake of Italian aggression in Ethiopia (which failure is considered by many to have been the deathknell for the League system). If these kinds of legal obligations can be disregarded only one, each Congressional vote on the commitment of troops called for by the Security Council will be more of a straw vote on the Security Council system than a debate on presidential policy in the specific circumstances. Thus, from the American perspective, the first casualty of a multilateral supranational peacekeeping system is probably the constitutional concerns underlying the War Powers debate. The current debate seems to have lost this insight, which is clear in the record of the Senate rejection of the league Covenant and the legislative history of the U.N. Participation Act of 1945. [13]
 

Looking to the future of the Security Council system, however, one should understand the import of periodic proposals to change either the composition of the permanent members of the Security Council or its voting rules. Given intervening changes in the community of States, suggestions have been made that Permanent members should no longer consist of World War II''s major Allied Powers. In particular, consideration has been given to recognizing economic power by including Japan and/or Germany among the Permanent Members along with some representation of developing nations (perhaps through "rotating" permanent member status among such larger countries as Brazil or Egypt).
 

Expanding the Security Council ''s regular or permanent membership may be a laudable goal (and may be practically compelled by pressures on the institution), but little attention has been paid to the effect this might have on the Security Council ''s peacekeeping role. To the extent regional conflicts increase in relative if not absolute frequency, it is unclear whether inclusion of developing nations with veto power will not return the Security Council to the kind of deadlock imposed by the Cold War. This question is based upon the idea that those Security Council members abstaining or voting against actions taken against Iraq in the present crisis either were developing nations or a State like China (which claims to support the interests of non-aligned States). If the vote were not unanimous in the Kuwait situation, it will never be. Alternatively, in connection with expanding Security Council membership, consideration has been given to changing the veto rules for Permanent Members (i.e., increasing the membership and requiring that something like two Permanent Members exercise their veto power together before blocking any action). For better or worse, this could possibly lead to true multilateral supranational peacekeeping (because the Security Council could exercise its authority to mandate coercive responses to disturbances or international peace on a less than unanimous basis). This possibility for coercive action without unanimity already exists for Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council, but abandonment of the current system would change some of the very basic choices made under the League Covenant and U.N. Charter. These kinds of changes with indirect effects on the Security Council system are not current hot topics of conversation, but proposals like them may be expected if the Kuwait situation is resolved successfully and political sentiment grows to expand the U.N.''s role in international peacekeeping.
 

Assuming a ''successful" resolution of the Kuwait crisis and a resulting boost to the idea generally of the rule of law in international affairs, one may expect a revival again of the idea of a permanent international criminal court to try individuals for grave breaches of international law (such as aggression, especially if the war crimes trials called for by president Bush and hinted at in the Security Council Resolutions on Kuwait actually take place). Fortuitously, work was recently recommenced on the long-running U.N. project involving the Draft Code of Offenses Against Mankind (dating back to the 1950s, in the wake of attempts to codify the Nuremberg principles). [14] Beyond Kuwait as the easy case, however, significant differences persist under national views of international law regarding the legal concepts of self-defense and aggression. It is not clear whether one can sensibly establish a standing tribunal where there is no agreement on the substantive law. However, a self-defense jurisprudence may be slowly building in the International Court of Justice. In that regard, the Flight 655 Case bears watching.
 
 

1. For clarity''s sake, we employ a shorthand in referring to different national views of international law in turn as the "American view," the Socialist law view," the "Continental legal science view" and the "Developing Nations view." Three caveats are in order. First, as might be guessed from the names, these views have been influenced traditionally both by political and legal factors. Second, views of the law have always differed within these broad categories (so monolithic characterization is overly simplistic). In particular, recent political developments in Eastern Europe probably will result in as yet unspecified changes in certain Socialist law views. Finally, time permits only a summary overview of the true legal complexity in this area.
 

2. To a certain degree, dating the modern "humanitarian" arms limitation movement in the law of war to the First Hague Peace Conference is somewhat arbitrary. On the sea warfare side, it might be argued that the abolition of privateering and regulation of neutral shipping rights in the 1856 Declaration of Paris dating back to the Crimean War is a precursor if not part of this movement, while the 1864 Geneva Agreement covers treatment of the wounded and the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grams Weight clearly concerns the limitation of specific weapons (explosive bullets) due to the special dangers and carnage they would wreak on troops. Despite these early agreements, it seems more reasonable to date the "movement" aspect from the First Hague Peace Conference.
 

3. Acknowledgment is due a continuing debate concerning the nature of constituent agreements creating international organizations (as is the U.N. Charter, although our interest lies chiefly in its Articles 2(4) and 51). See generally S. Rosenne, Developments in the law of treaties 1945-1986 181-258 (1989). Passing over longstanding academic distinctions, the debate is characterized by parties" attitudes towards international organizations themselves and their political role. On the one hand, a constituent agreement may be viewed as a constitutional document, the interpretation of which may be given legitimately to its political or judicial organs. By analogy to a separation of powers analysis, it is possible that both organs have interpretive competencies. It is not clear, however, that a judicial interpretation generally would take precedence (and in the case of the International Court of Justice''s interpretations of the U.N. Charter it may not). Id. at 225-26, citing 12 U.N.C.I.O. 709 (declaration prepared by Committee II/2 subsequently adopted by the entire conference at San Francisco). On the other hand, a constituent agreement may be viewed as an international law agreement like any other, the provisions of which are subject to the standard interpretive approach. While Articles 2(4) and 51 on their face relate to substantive norms, Articles 2(4) and 51 on their face relate to substantive norms, it might be argues that they are so bound up in the politically oriented Security Council peacekeeping system that their proper interpretation must be consigned to it and not the International Court of Justice (the Security Council would remain free to request an advisory opinion or call upon the parties under Article 33(2) to settle their dispute before the International Court of Justice).
 

4. In the immediate aftermath of postwar war crimes trials, the U.N. undertook to define the aggression concept in the context of formulating a restatement of the so-called Nuremberg principles and the Draft Code of Offenses Against Mankind as substantive law to guide a proposed international criminal tribunal as a permanent replacement for the international military tribunals criticized in some quarters as drumhead courts of the victorious Allies. In various venues, these efforts continued sporadically from the late 1940s through the early 1980s. The General Assembly has promulgated certain generalized statements of principles and compromise definitions in this area (purporting to be statements of existing law), most notably the Declaration on Principles of Internal Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Resolution 2625 (XXXV 1970), and the Definition of Aggression Resolution, G.A. Resolution 3314 Annex (XXIX 1974). However, their drafting history, text and generalized nature permit the judgment that they provide better evidence of diplomatic compromise than the law. Different States" views of applicable law are incorporated in different and often conflicting individual provisions. As a result, by stressing different provisions within the same document, different States may advance their own views. By trying to be all things to all States, these documents fail to provide guidance to applicable law in individual circumstances.
 

5. 2 J.B. Moore, Digest of International Law 412 (1906).
 

6. Public international law caselaw does not have the same precedential value as common law cases. Nonetheless, the Court''s Cases are consulted as good evidence of the law, albeit non-binding ones.
 

7. 1949 I.C.J. 3 (merits). For a detailed analysis of the case see Linnan, Self-defense, Necessity and U.N. Collective Security Under International Law: American and Other Views (forthcoming in Spring 1991 issue of the Duke J. Comp. And Int"l L.).
 

8. 1984 I.C.J. 4 (merits). For a detailed analysis of self-defense aspects of the case see Linnan, note 7 supra. Curiously and perhaps understandably given the Contra Case''s politically inflammatory nature, the opinion studiously avoided examination or even significant mention of the legal concept of aggression as such (indirect or otherwise, whether on the part of the United States or Nicaragua).
 

9. 28 I.L.M. 843 91989) (International Court of Justice 1989 General List No. 79).
 

10. See generally D.F. Fleming, The United States and the League of Nations 1918-1920 (1932). It is noteworthy that the records of the Senate debates include numerous speeches of leaders of the bar addressing these concerns. E.G., 58 Congressional Record part 3, at 2579 (July 10, 1919, address of George Wharton Pepper before the New Jersey Bar Association).
 

11. Political pundits speak of "neo-isolationism" and the "McGovern-Buchanan Axis." E.G., Barnett, You Can"t Tell the Gulf Pundits Without a Scorecard, The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, December 24-30, 1990, at 24.
 

12. Codified at 22 U.S.C.A. Section 287 et seq. (1990). Section 287d authorizes the President to negotiate a general umbrella agreement with the Security Council for the provision of American troops, which agreement was to be subject to Congresses" approval but has apparently never been entered into. The legislative history contains the view that, once the agreement were approved, no further Congressional approval would be necessary for any individual provision of American troops to the Security Council on the somewhat glib ground that no declaration of war problems were presented (since they would be engaged in preserving or restoring international peace). See House Report No. 1838, U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 927, 933-34 (79^th Cong., 1^st Sess., December 12, 1945). The legislative history may show more candor in its obligations and the Security Council peacekeeping system itself were inconsistent with the idea of Congressional debate on a declaration of war. Under Section 287a, the President directs the U.S. representative on the Security Council as to how to vote. The Security Council vote may then mandate action under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
 

13. See note 12 supra.
 

14. See note 4 supra.
 
 

The Security Council,
 

Alarmed by the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 by the military forces of Iraq.
 

Determining that there exists a breach of international peace and security as regards the Iraq invasion of Kuwait.
 

Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations.
 

1. Condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait;
 

2. Demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990;
 

3. Decides to meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure compliance with the present resolution.
 
 

The Security Council,
 

Reaffirming its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990.
 

Deeply concerned that resolution has not been implemented and that the invasion by Iraq of Kuwait continues with further loss of human life and material destruction.
 

Determined to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait.
 

Noting that the legitimate Government of Kuwait has expressed its readiness to comply with resolution 660 (1990).
 

Mindful of its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.
 

Affirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter.
 

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
 

1. Determines that Iraq so far has failed to comply with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 (1990) and has usurped the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait;
 

2. Decides, as a consequence, to take the following measures to secure compliance of Iraq with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 (1990) and to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait;
 

3. Decides that all States shall prevent:
 

(a) the import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution;
 

(b) any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export or trans-shipment of any commodities or products from Iraq or Kuwait; and any dealings by their nationals or their flag vessels or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in Iraq or Kuwait and exported therefrom after the date of the preset resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait for the purposes of such activities or dealings;
 

(c) The sale or supply by their national or from their territories or using their flag vessels of any commodities or products, including weapons or any other military equipment, supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Iraq or Kuwait, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply of such commodities or products;
 

4. Decides that all States shall not make available to the Government of Iraq or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from removing from their territories or otherwise making available to that Government or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait, except payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs;
 

5. Calls upon all States, including States non-members of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or license granted before the date of the present resolution;
 

6. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:
 

(a) To examine the reports on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution which will be submitted by the Secretary-General;
 

(b) to seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the provisions laid down in the present resolution;

7. Calls upon all States to co-operate fully with the Committee in the fulfillment of its tasks, including supplying such information as may be sought by the Committee in pursuance of the present resolution;
 

8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the Committee and to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for the purpose;
 

9. Decides that, notwithstanding paragraphs 4 through 8 above, nothing in the present resolution shall prohibit assistance to the legitimate Government of Kuwait, and calls upon all States;
 

(a) To take appropriate measures to protect assets of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and its agencies;
 

(b) Not to recognize any regime set up by the occupying Power;
 

10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution, the first report to be submitted within thirty days;
 

11. Decides to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its efforts to put an early end to the invasion by Iraq.
 
 

The Security Council,
 

Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) and 661 (1990),
 

Gravely alarmed by the declaration by Iraq of a "comprehensive and eternal merger" with Kuwait,
 

Demanding, once again, that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990,
 

Determined to bring the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait,
 

Determined also to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait,
 

1. Decides that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any form and whatever pretext has no legal validity, and is considered null and void;
 

2. Calls upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize that annexation, and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation;
 

3. Further demands that Iraq rescind its actions purporting to annex Kuwait;
 

4. Decides to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its efforts to put an early and to the occupation.
 
 

The Security Council,
 

Recalling the Iraqi invasion and purported annexation of Kuwait and resolutions 660, 661 and 662,
 

Deeply concerned for the safety and well being of third state nationals in Iraq and Kuwait,
 

Recalling the obligations of Iraq in this regard under international law,
 

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to pursue urgent consultations with the Government of Iraq following the concern and anxiety expressed by the members of the Council on 17 August 1990,
 

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter:
 

1. Demands that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of third countries and grant immediate and continuing access of consular officials to such nationals;
 

2. Further demands that Iraq take no action to jeopardize the safety, security or health of such nationals;
 

3. Reaffirms its decision in resolution 662 (1990) that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq is null and void, and therefore demands that the government of Iraq rescind its orders for the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the withdrawal of the immunity of their personnel, and refrain from any such actions in the future;
 

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on compliance with this resolution at the earliest possible time.
 
 

The Security Council,
 

Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990) and demanding their full and immediate implementation.
 

Having decided in resolution 661 (1990) to impose economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
 

Deploring the loss of innocent life stemming from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and determined to prevent further such losses.
 

Gravely alarmed that Iraq continues to refuse to comply with resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990) and in particular at the conduct of the Government of Iraq in using Iraq flag vessels to export oil,
 

1. Calls upon those Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid down in resolution 661 (1990);
 

2. Invites Member States accordingly to co-operate as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of resolution 661 (1990) with maximum use of political and diplomatic measures, in accordance with paragraph 1 above;
 

3. Request all States to provide in accordance with the Charter such assistance as may be required by the States referred to in paragraph 1 above;
 

4. Further requests the States concerned to co-ordinate their actions in pursuit of the above paragraphs of this resolution using as appropriate mechanisms of the Military Staff Committee and after consultation with the Secretary-General to submit reports to the Security Council and its Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) to facilitate the monitoring of the implementation of this resolution;
 

5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
 
 

The Security Council,
 

Recalling its resolution 661 (1990), paragraphs 3 (c) and 4 of which apply, except in humanitarian circumstances, to foodstuffs,
 

Recognizing that circumstances may arise in which it will be necessary for foodstuffs to be supplied to the civilian population in Iraq or Kuwait in order to relieve human suffering,
 

Noting that in this respect the Committee established under paragraph 6 of that resolution has received communications from several Member States,
 

Emphasizing that it is for the Security Council, alone or acting through the Committee, to determine whether humanitarian circumstances have arisen,
 

Deeply concerned that Iraq has failed to comply with its obligations under Security Council resolution 664 (1990) in respect of the safety and well-being of third State nationals, and reaffirming that Iraq retains full responsibility in this regard under international humanitarian law including, where applicable, the Fourth Geneva Convention,
 

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
 

1. Decides that in order to make the necessary determination whether or not for the purposes of paragraph 3 (c) and paragraph 4 of resolution 661 91990) humanitarian circumstances have arisen, the Committee shall keep the situation regarding foodstuffs in Iraq and Kuwait under constant review;
 

2. Expects Iraq to comply with its obligations under Security Council resolution 664 (1990) in respect of third State nationals and reaffirms that Iraq remains fully responsible for their safety and well-being in accordance with international humanitarian law including, where applicable, the Fourth Geneva Convention;
 

3. Requests, for the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this resolution, that the Secretary-General seeks urgently, and on a continuing basis, information from relevant United Nations and other appropriate humanitarian agencies and all other sources on the availability of food in Iraq and Kuwait, such information to be communicated by the Secretary-General to the Committee regularly;
 

4. Requests further that in seeking and supplying such information particular attention will be paid to such categories of persons who might suffer specially, such as children under 15 years of age, expectant mothers, maternity cases, the sick and the elderly;
 

5. Decides that if the Committee, after receiving the reports from the Secretary-General, determines that circumstances have arisen in which there is an urgent humanitarian need to supply foodstuffs to Iraq or Kuwait in or to relieve human suffering, it will report promptly to the Council its decision as to how such need should be met;
 

6. Directs the Committee that in formulating its decisions it should bear in mind that foodstuffs should be provided through the United Nations in co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross or other appropriate humanitarian agencies and distributed by them or under their supervision in order to ensure that they reach the intended beneficiaries;
 

7. Requests the Secretary-General to use his good offices to facilitate the delivery and distribution of foodstuffs to Kuwait and Iraq in accordance with the provisions of this other relevant resolutions;
 

8. Recalls that resolution 661 (1990) does not apply to supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, but in this connection recommends that medical supplies should be exported under the strict supervision of the Government of the exporting State or by appropriate humanitarian agencies.
 
 

The Security Council,
 

Reaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990) and 666 (1990),
 

Recalling the Vienna Conventions of 18 April 1961 on diplomatic relations and of 24 April 1963 on consular relations, to both of which Iraq is a party,
 

Considering that the decision of Iraq to order the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and to withdraw the immunity and privileges of these missions and their personnel is contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, the international Conventions mentioned above and international law,
 

Deeply concerned that Iraq, notwithstanding the decisions of the Security Council and the provisions of the Conventions mentioned above, has committed acts of violence against diplomatic missions and their personnel in Kuwait,
 

Outraged at recent violations by Iraq of diplomatic premises in Kuwait and at the abduction of personnel enjoying diplomatic immunity and foreign nationals who were present in these premises.
 

Considering that the above actions by Iraq constitute aggressive acts and a flagrant violation of its international obligations which strike at the root of the conduct of international relations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
 

Recalling that Iraq is fully responsible for any use of violence against foreign nationals or against any diplomatic or consular mission in Kuwait or its personnel,
 

Determined to ensure respect for its decisions and for Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations,
 

Further considering that the grave nature of Iraq''s actions, which constitute a new escalation of its violations of international law, obliges the Council not only to express its immediate reaction but also to consult urgently to take further concrete measures to ensure Iraq''s compliance with the Council''s resolutions.
 

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
 

1. Strongly condemns aggressive acts perpetrated by Iraq against diplomatic premises and personnel in Kuwait, including the abduction of foreign nations who were present in those premises;
 

2. Demands the immediate release of those foreign nationals as well as all nationals mentioned in resolution 664 (1990);
 

3. Further demands that Iraq immediately and fully comply with its international obligations under resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990) of the Security Council, the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic and consular relations and international law;
 

4. Further demands that Iraq immediately protect the safety and well-being of diplomatic and consular personnel and premises in Kuwait and in Iraq and take no action to hinder the diplomatic and consular missions in the performance of their person and interests;
 

5. Reminds all States that they are obliged to observe strictly resolutions 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990) and 666 (1990);
 

6. Decides to consult urgently to take further concrete measures as soon as possible, under Chapter VII of the Charter, in response to Iraq''s continued violation of the Charter, of resolutions of the Council and of International law.
 
 

The Security Council,
 

Recalling its resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990,
 

Recalling also Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations,
 

Conscious of the fact that an increasing number of requests for assistance have been received under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations,
 

Entrusts the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait with the task of examining requests for assistance under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations and making recommendations to the President of the Security Council for appropriate action.
 
 

The Security Council,
 

Reaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), and 667 (1990),
 

Condemning Iraq''s continued occupation of Kuwait, its failure to rescind its actions and end its purported annexation and its holding of third State nationals against their will, in flagrant violation of resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990) and 667 (1990) and of international humanitarian law,
 

Meeting with grave concern the persistent attempts to evade the measures laid down in resolution 661 (1990),
 

Further noting that a number of states have limited the number of Iraqi diplomatic and consular officials in their countries and that others are planning to do so,
 

Determined to ensure by all necessary means that strict and complete application of the measures laid down in resolution 661 (1990),
 

Determined to ensure respect for its decisions and the provisions of Articles 25 and 48 of the Charter of the United Nations,
 

Affirming that any acts of the Government of Iraq which are contrary to the above-mentioned resolutions or to Articles 25 or 48 of the Charter of the United Nations, such as Decree No. 377 of the Revolution Command Council of Iraq of 16 September 1990, are null and void,
 

Reaffirming its determination to ensure compliance with Security Council resolutions by maximum use of political and diplomatic means,
 

Welcoming the Secretary-General''s use of his good offices to advance a peaceful solution based on the relevant Security Council resolutions and noting with appreciation his continuing efforts to this end.
 

Underlining to the Government of Iraq that its continued failure to comply with the terms of resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 666 (1990) and 667 (1990) could lead to further serious action by the Council under the Charter of the United Nations, including under chapter VII,
 

Recalling the provisions of Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations,
 

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
 

1. Calls upon all States to carry out their obligations to ensure strict and complete compliance with resolution 661 (1990) and in particular paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 thereof;
 

2. Confirms that resolution 661 (1990) applies to all means of transport, including aircraft;
 

3. Decides that all States, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any license or permit granted before the date of the present resolution, shall deny permission to any aircraft to take off from their territory if the aircraft would carry any cargo to or from Iraq or Kuwait other than food in humanitarian circumstances, subject to authorization by the Council or the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) in accordance with resolution 666 (1990), or supplies intended strictly for medical purposes or solely for UNIMOG;
 

4. Decides further that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft destined to land in Iraq or Kuwait, whatever its State of registration, to overfly its territory unless;
 

(a) The aircraft lands at an airfield designated by that State outside Iraq or Kuwait in order to permit its inspection to ensure that the is not cargo on board in violation of resolution 661 (1990) or the present resolution, and for this purpose the aircraft may be detained for as long as necessary; or
 

(b) The particular flight has been approved by the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990); or
 

(c) The flight is certified by the United Nations as solely for the purposes of UNIMOG;
 

5. Decides that each State shall take all necessary measures to ensure that any aircraft registered in its territory or operated by an operator who has his principal place of business or permanent residence in its territory complies with the provisions of resolution 661 (1990) and the present resolution;
 

6. Decides further that all States shall notify in a timely fashion the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) of any flight between its territory and Iraq or Kuwait to which the requirement to land in paragraph 4 above does not apply, and the purpose for such a flight;
 

7. Calls upon all States to co-operate in taking such measures as may be necessary, consistent with international law, including the Chicago Convention, to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of resolution 661 (1990) or the present resolution;
 

8. Calls upon all States to detain any ships of Iraq registry which enter their ports and which are being or have been used in violation of resolutio 661 (1990), or to deny such ships entrance to their ports except in circumstances recognized under international law as necessary to safeguard human life;
 

9. Reminds all States of their obligations under resolution 661 (1990) with regard to the freezing of Iraq assets, and the protection of the assets of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and its agencies, located within their territory and to report to the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) regarding those assets;
 

10. Calls upon all States to provide to the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) information regarding the action taken by them to implement the provisions laid down in the present resolution;
 

11. Affirms that the United Nations Organization, the specialized agenices and other international organizations in the United Nations system are required to take such measures as may be necessary to give effect to the terms of resolution 661 (1990) and this resolution;
 

12. Decides to consider, in the event of evasion of the provisions of resolution 661 (1990) or of the present resolution by a State or its nationals or through its territory, measures directed at the State in question to prevent such evasion;
 

13. Reaffirms that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to Kuwait and that as a High Contracting party to the Convention Iraq is bound to comply fully with all its terms and in particular is liable under the Convention in respect of the grave breaches committed by it, as are individuals who commit or order the commission of grave breaches.
 
 

The Security Council,
 

Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990), and 670 (1990),
 

Stressing the urgent need for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraq forces from Kuwait, for the restoration of Kuwait''s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and of the authority of its legitimate Government,
 

Condemning the actions by the Iraq authorities and occupying forces to take third-state nationals hostage and to mistreat and oppress Kuwait and third-state nationals, and the other actions reported to the Council such as the destruction of Kuwait demographic records, forced departure of Kuwaits and relocation of population in Kuwait and the unlawful destruction and seizure of public and violation of the decisions of this Council, the Charter of the United Nations, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and international law,
 

Expressing grave alarm over the situation of nationals of third states in Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of the diplomatic and consular missions of such states,
 

Reaffirming that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to Kuwait and that as a high contracting party to the convention, Iraq is bound to comply fully with all its terms and in particular is liable under the convention in respect of the grave breaches committed by it, as are individuals who commit or order the commission of grave breaches,
 

Recalling the efforts of the Secretary-General concerning the safety and well-being of third-state nationals in Iraq and Kuwait,
 

Deeply concerned at the economic cost, and at the loss and suffering caused to individuals in Kuwait and Iraq as a result of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait and Iraq as a result of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq,
 

Acting under Charter VII of the United Nations Charter,
 

Reaffirming the goal of the international community of maintaining international peace and security by seeking to resolve international disputes and conflicts through peaceful means,
 

Recalling also the important role that the United Nations and its Secretary-General have played in the peaceful solution of disputes and conflicts in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter,
 

Alarmed by the dangers of the present crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, directly threatening international peace and security, and seeking to avoid any further worsening of the situation,
 

Calling upon Iraq to comply with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, in particular Resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990), and 664 (1990).
 

Reaffirming its determination to ensure compliance by Iraq with the Security Council resolutions by maximum use of political and diplomatic means,
 

1. Demands that the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces immediately cease and desist from taking third-state nationals hostage, and mistreating and oppressing Kuwait and third-state nations, and from any other actions such as those reported to the Council and described above, violating the decisions of this Council, the Charter of the United Nations, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and international law;
 

2. Invites states to collate substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them on the grave breaches by Iraq as per paragraph # 1 above and to make this information available to the Council;
 

3. Reaffirms its demand that Iraq immediately fulfill its obligations to third-state nationals in Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of diplomatic and consular missions, under the Charter, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, general principles of international law and the relevant resolutions of the Council;
 

4. Reaffirms further its demand that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate department form Kuwait and Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of those third-state nationals, including diplomatic and consular personnel, who wish to leave;
 

5. Demands that Iraq ensure the immediate access to food, water and basic services necessary to the protection and well-being of Kuwait nationals and of nationals of third states in Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait;
 

6. Reaffirms its demand that Iraq immediately protect the safety and well-being of diplomatic and consular personnel and premises in Kuwait and in Iraq, take no action to hinder these diplomatic and consular missions in the performance of their functions, including access to their nationals and the protection of their person and interests and rescind its orders for the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the withdrawal of the immunity of their personnel;
 

7. Requests the Secretary-General, in the context of the continued exercise of his good offices concerning the safety and well-being of third-state nationals in Iraq and Kuwait, to seek to achieve the objectives of paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 and in particular the provision of food, water and basic services to Kuwait nations and to the diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the evacuation of third-state nationals;
 

8. Reminds Iraq under international law it is liable for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third states, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq;
 

9. Invites states to collect relevant information regarding their claims, and those of their nationals and corporations, for restitution or financial compensation by Iraq with a view to such arrangements as may be established in accordance with international law;
 

10. Requires that Iraq comply with the provisions of the present resolution and its previous resolutions, failing which the Council will need to take further measures under the Charter;
 

11. Decides to remain actively and permanently seized of the matter until Kuwait has regained its independence and peace has been restored in conformity with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.
 

12. Reposes its trust in the Secretary-General to make available his good offices and, as he considers appropriate, to pursue them and undertake diplomatic efforts in order to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990), and 664 (1990), and calls on all states, both those in the region and others, to pursue on this basis their efforts to this end, in conformity with the Charter, in order to improve the situation and restores peace, security and stability;
 

13. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the results of his good offices and diplomatic efforts.
 
 

The Security Council,
 

Recalling resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990 and 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990,
 

Reiterating its concern for the suffering caused to individuals in Kuwait as a result of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq,
 

Gravely concerned at the ongoing attempt by Iraq to alter the demographic composition of the population of Kuwait and to destroy the civil records maintained by the legitimate Government of Kuwait,
 

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
 

1. Condemns the attempts by Iraq to alter the demographic composition of the population of Kuwait and to destroy the civil records maintained by the legitimate Government of Kuwait;
 

2. Mandates the Secretary-General to take custody of a copy of the population register of Kuwait the authenticity of which has been certified by the legitimate Government of Kuwait which covers the population registration up to 1 August 1990;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to establish, in cooperation with the legitimate Government of Kuwait, an Order of Rules and Regulations governing access and use of the said copy of the population register.
 
 

The Security Council,
 

Recalling and reaffirming its Resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990), 669 (1990), 670 (1990), 674 (1990) and 677 (1990),
 

Noting that, despite all efforts by the United Nations, Iraq refuses to comply with its obligation to implement Resolution 660 (1990) and subsequent resolutions, in flagrant contempt of the Council,
 

Mindful of its duties and responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance and preservation of international peace and security,
 

Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,
 

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
 

1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of good will, to do so;
 

2. Authorizes member states cooperating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before Jan. 15, 1991, fully implements, as set forth in paragraph # 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement the Security Council Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant Resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area;
 

3. Requests all states to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of this resolution;
 

4. Requests the states concerned to keep the Council regularly informed on the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to the paragraphs 2 and 3 of this resolution; and
 

5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.